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GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS-JUDICIAL REVIEW UNDER DISPUTES 
CLAUSE-In a factual dispute arising under a standard government con-
struction contract, the contractor followed the procedures required by the 
disputes clause.1 The contractor, after its claim was denied by the con-
tracting officer, appealed to the Board of Claims and Appeals of the Corps 
of Engineers. The Board rejected the claim, and the contractor brought 
suit in the Court of Claims, alleging, in the words of the Wunderlich Act,2 
that the Board's decision was "capricious or arbitrary or so grossly erroneous 
as necessarily to imply bad faith, or was not supported by substantial evi-
dence." Over the Government's objection, a commissioner of the court re-
ceived evidence de novo and concluded that the contractor was entitled 
to recover. The court received further evidence on the issue of damages 
and entered judgment for the contractor.3 On certiorari, held, reversed, 
two Justices dissenting. In cases subject to the standard disputes clause, the 
court may look only to the administrative record in order to determine, 
with respect to any of the Wunderlich Act's standards of finality except 
fraud, whether the administrative decision should retain its finality. United 
States v. Carlo Bianchi b Co., 373 U.S. 709 (1963). 
Under the standard disputes clause, an appeal from the decision of a 
contracting officer is generally to a contract appeals board to which the 
department head has delegated his authority.4 These boards operate under 
1 The standard clause involved in the principal case provided: "Except as other-
wise specifically provided in this contract, all disputes concerning questions of fact 
arising under this contract shall be decided by the contracting officer subject to written 
appeal by the contractor within 30 days to the head of the department concerned or his 
duly authorized representative, whose decision shall be final and conclusive upon the 
parties thereto. In the meantime the contractor shall diligently proceed with the work 
as directed." Principal case at 710 n.2. This clause became obsolete with the passage of 
the Wunderlich Act, 68 Stat. 81 (1954), 41 U.S.C. §§ 321-22 (1958). The clause currently 
in use is found in Standard Form 23A: General Provisions (Construction Contract), 
41 C.F.R. § 1-16.901-23A(6) (1963). The essential change is the inclusion of the 
language of the Wunderlich Act, quoted note 2 infra. 
2 68 Stat. 81 (1954), 41 U.S.C. §§ 321-22 (1958). The first section, which is the only 
one here applicable, provides: "No provision of any contract entered into by the United 
States, relating to the finality or conclusiveness of any decision of the head of any 
department or agency or his duly authorized representative or board in a dispute involving 
a question arising under such contract, shall be pleaded in any suit now filed or to be 
filed as limiting judicial review of any such decision to cases where fraud by such official 
or his said representative or board is alleged: Provided, however, that any such decision 
shall be final and conclusive unless the same is fradulent [sic] or capricious or arbitrary or 
so grossly erroneous as necessarily to imply bad faith, or is not supported by substantial 
evidence." 
3 For discussions of this case and others subsequent to the Court of Claims decision, 
see Harrison, Eight Years After Wunderlich-Confusion in the Courts, 28 GEO. WASH. L. 
REv. 561 (1960); Note, 17 WYo. L.J. 73 (1962). 
4 Haas, Contract Procedures for Obtaining Additional Compensation Under Govern-
ment Construction Contracts, 24 FORDHAM L. REv. 535, 543 (1956); Joy, The Disputes 
Clause in Government Contracts: A Survey of Court and Administrative Decisions, 
25 FORDHAM L. REY. 11, 17 (1956). Not all of the departments and agencies have such 
boards. Thus, references in the text to "board" will include reference to department and 
agency heads where no board is in existence. 
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procedural rules and regulations promulgated by the various departments 
and agencies5 and are not subject to the Administrative Procedure Act.6 
In United States v. Wunderlich1 the Supreme Court declared that fraud 
was the only ground on which the finality of a board's decision could be 
challenged. Prior to this decision, the standards of finality established by 
the Supreme Court had been fraud and error so gross as to imply bad 
faith.8 The Court of Claims had expanded the list of standards to include 
arbitrariness and capriciousness,9 but in the district10 and circuit courts 
there was some dissent11 from this expansion. It is not altogether clear what 
procedure was followed by the courts in reviewing decisions of boards dur-
ing the pre-Wunderlich period; however, it appears that they must have 
admitted evidence de novo or else held full trials de novo prior to making 
any decision on the question of finality.12 The Wunderlich Act, passed in 
response to the Wunderlich case,13 was an attempt to restore the availability 
of review on broader grounds. The intent of Congress, as specifically set 
forth in the committee reports, was to adopt the standards generally applied 
prior to the Wunderlich case,14 and to add one new standard-substantial 
evidence.15 The avowed purpose of this addition was to force each party to 
5 E.g., Agriculture Department, 7 C.F.R. §§ 2.400-.440 (1963); Department of Defense, 
32 C.F.R. § 30.1 (Cum. Supp. 1963); Rules of the Corps of Engineers Board of Contract 
Appeals, 33 C.F.R. § 210.4 (1962). 
6 60 Stat. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. §§ 1001-11 (1958). It is not wholly clear that the 
Administrative Procedure Act does not apply; however, it has never been applied and 
the Government Accounting Office recently ruled specifically that it has no applica-
tion to procedures arising under the disputes clause. G.A.O. B-152346, 32 U.S.L. WEEK 
2280 (Nov. 22, 1963). 
7 342 U.S. 98 (1951). 
s United States v. Moorman, 338 U.S. 457, 461 (1950). In some of the earlier cases, 
failure to exercise honest judgment was also a ground for denying finality, but this 
standard was subsequently dropped. Martinsburg & P.R.R. v. March, 114 U.S. 549, 551 
(1885). 
9 L. E. Myers Co. v. United States, 101 Ct. Cl. 41, 64 F. Supp. 148 (1944); Silberblatt & 
Lasker, Inc. v. United States, 101 Ct. Cl. 54 (1944). 
10 The district courts are given jurisdiction concurrent with that of the Court of 
Claims over claims not exceeding $10,000 by 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (1958). Jurisdiction is 
conferred on the Court of Claims by 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1958). 
11 See Lindsay v. United States, 181 F.2d 582 (9th Cir. 1950), where fraud and gross 
mistake implying bad faith were the only two standards applied. 
12 An administrative record was not always available as a basis for review. See 
Volentine & Littleton v. United States, 136 Ct. Cl. 638, 145 F. Supp. 952 (1956). Extensive 
findings of fact were made in all Court of Claims decisions. E.g., Great Lakes Dredge 
& Dock Co. v. United States, 116 Ct. Cl. 679, 90 F. Supp. 963 (1950); Loftis v. United 
States, 110 Ct. Cl. 551, 76 F. Supp. 816 (1948); Bein v. United States, 101 Ct. Cl. 144 
(1943). And, when a board's decision was overturned, no further administrative proceedings 
were necessary before judgment could be rendered by the Court of Claims. Great Lakes 
Dredge & Dock Co. v. United States, supra; Loftis v. United States, supra; Bein v. United 
States, supra. 
13 H.R. REP. No. 1380, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1954); S. REP. No. 32, 83d Cong., 1st 
Sess. 1 (1953). The Senate report is substantially included in that of the House; hereafter 
only the House report will be cited. 
14 H.R. REP. No. 1380, op. cit. supra note 13, at 1, 2, 3. 
15 Substantial evidence means "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might 
accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 
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present its side of the controversy openly and to afford each an opportunity 
to rebut the other's evidence.16 By including the substantial evidence re-
quirement in the Wunderlich Act, Congress called forth a wealth of prec-
edent concerning judicial review of administrative decisions. The standard 
had long been used in this area, and in all but a few instances its applica-
tion had been limited to review based solely on the administrative record.17 
Substantial evidence, however, was only one of the five standards con-
tained in the Wunderlich Act. Although the manner of review concerning 
substantial evidence was fairly clear,18 the manner of review with respect 
to the other four standards was not. This is evident from the fact that, 
subsequent to the Wunderlich decision, a split developed between the Court 
of Claims (which admitted evidence de novo whenever a transgression of 
any of the standards was alleged)19 and the district courts (which refused 
to look beyond the administrative record unless fraud was alleged).20 In 
the principal case the Supreme Court followed the district courts, thus de-
claring, in effect, that the nature of review appropriate to the substantial 
evidence standard is appropriate also to all the other standards except 
fraud. The Court conceded that, where fraud is alleged, evidence extrinsic 
to the record is admissible in order to prove it.21 
In reaching its decision the Court relied on the Wunderlich Act, inter-
preting it as limiting the manner of review of a board's decision to an exam-
ination of the administrative record only. The Court found support in 
both the language of the act and its legislative history, placing particular 
emphasis on the inclusion of the substantial evidence standard.22 However, 
a careful examination of both these sources indicates that the Court's in-
terpretation was not forced upon it by either, and that, but for the presence 
of the substantial evidence standard, the opposite conclusion might easily 
have been reached. The act speaks only of the availability of judicial re-
view, saying nothing about the manner of review, and the legislative history 
gives no definite indication that Congress intended to deal with anything 
more than availability.23 
197, 229 (1938). This basic test was adhered to in Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 
U.S. 474 (1951), where it was also held that the review should be on the whole record 
and not merely on the evidence tending to support the finding. 
16 H.R. REP. No. 1380, op. cit. supra note 13, at 5. 
17 See Mann Chem. Labs. v. United States, 174 F. Supp. 563,565 (D. Mass. 1958). 
18 Principal case at 715. 
19 E.g., P.L.S. Coat &: Suit Corp. v. United States, 148 Ct. CI. 296, 180 F. Supp. 400 
(1960); Carlo Bianchi &: Co. v. United States, 144 Ct. CI. 500, 169 F. Supp. 514 (1959), 
rev'd, in principal case; Fehlhaber Corp. v. United States, 139 Ct. Cl. 837, 151 F. Supp. 
817, cert. denied, 355 U.S. 877 (1957); Volentine &: Littleton v. United States, 136 Ct. Cl. 
638, 145 F. Supp. 952 (1956). 
20 E.g., Wells &: Wells, Inc. v. United States, 269 F.2d 412 (8th Cir. 1959); United 
States v. Hamden Co-op. Creamery Co., 185 F. Supp. 541 (E.D.N.Y. 1960), afj'd, 297 F.2d 
130 (2d Cir. 1961); Mann Chem. Labs. v. United States, 174 F. Supp. 563 (D. Mass. 
1958). 
21 Principal case at 714. 
22 Id. at 714-17. 
23 Concerning the act's language, the Court noted that the act is entitled, "An 
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If, therefore, the act deals only with availability of review, the Court in 
the principal case was, in reality, free to consider the most appropriate 
manner of review under the various standards. An approach more in line 
with the intent of Congress to make review available would have been to 
segregate the substantial evidence standard just as the Court had previously 
segregated fraud,24 for yet a third kind of review would be most appropri-
ate where it is alleged that a board's decision was arbitrary or capricious or 
so grossly erroneous as necessarily to imply bad faith. If, for example, a 
board considered evidence submitted ex parte to be decisively significant,2G 
its decision would apparently be capricious or arbitrary, yet the reviewing 
court would not necessarily discover this by looking at the administrative 
record alone. It is possible that a decision ultimately turning on such 
evidence would still be supported by substantial evidence. If, therefore, 
meaningful review is to be available unde:,; these three standards, the con• 
tractor must be allowed to introduce in court a limited amount of evidence 
extrinsic to the record,26 and in denying the admission of any extrinsic 
evidence, the Supreme Court appears partially to have contravened the 
policy behind the Wunderlich Act. This is not to suggest a return to the 
Court of Claims position with an exception for substantial evidence. Only 
evidence dealing directly with whether a board's decision was fraudulent, 
Act to permit review •... " Principal case at 714. It relied on National Broadcasting 
Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943), and Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v. United States, 
280 U.S. 420 (1930), to show that where, in other legislation, Congress had called for 
"review" without specifying procedures, the Court had refused to admit evidence 
extrinsic to the administrative record. In those cases the Secretary of Agriculture and the 
Federal Communications Commission were authorized by statutes to fix rates and make 
regulations, respectively. They performed typical administrative functions, and their 
procedures are today subject to the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 60 Stat. 237 
(1946), 5 U.S.C. §§ 1001-11 (1958). In the area of government contracts, the administrative 
authority is conferred by contract, and, as noted in text, the APA is not applicable. The 
differences between these two contexts suggest that it is not necessary that one control 
the other. 
As to the intent of Congress, the manner of review contemplated under the proposed 
legislation is not once specifically mentioned in H.R. REP. No. 1380, op. cit. supra note 13, 
or in the hearings. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Review of Finality Clauses in 
Government Contracts of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 83d Cong., 1st &: 2d Sess., 
ser. 12 (1953-1954) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on Review of Finality Clauses]; Hearings 
on S. 2487 Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 82d Cong., 2d 
Sess. (1952). The question of the manner of review utilized prior to the Wunderlich 
decision came up twice in the House hearings (two witnesses flatly contradicted each 
other, Hearings on Review of Finality Clauses 59, 79), but not a word was uttered 
shedding any light on the kind of review anticipated. 
24 E.g., principal case at 714. 
25 The dissent hinted that this may have been true in the principal case. See 
principal case at 719. On remand, however, the issue was not presented. Carlo Bianchi &: 
Co. v. United States, No. 466-54, Ct. Cl. Comm'r Rep., Nov. 4, 1963, at 2. 
26 The Court of Claims has taken the principal case to mean that the court may base 
its action on nothing but the administrative record and briefs of counsel. See 'Wingate 
Constr. Co. v. United States, No. 394-60, Ct. Cl., Jan. 24, 1964, at 7 (by implication); 
Carlo Bianchi & Co. v. United States, supra note 25, at 2. Thus the court would 
apparently not consider a party's affidavit that the board had grounded its decision on 
ex parte information or otherwise acted arbitrarily or capriciously in a manner not 
reflected in the administrative record. 
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arbitrary, capnoous, or so grossly erroneous as necessarily to imply bad 
faith should be admissible.27 Such a procedure would be particularly ap-
propriate in view of the trial facilities maintained by the reviewing courts. 
It is arguable that the Wunderlich Act should be interpreted as going 
to the jurisdiction of the reviewing courts, although this position does not 
appear to have been accepted by any court. Such an approach would view 
the act as conferring original jurisdiction where fraud is alleged and as 
conferring a sort of appellate jurisdiction in all other cases. The following 
factors tend to confirm the position recently taken by the Court of Claims 
that the act has nothing to do with jurisdiction.28 First, the act speaks in 
terms of pleading and review; there is no express jurisdictional language.29 
Second, although there is no conclusive expression of congressional intent, it 
appears that none of the participants in the hearings before the House sub-
committee believed that a jurisdictional question was involved.30 Third, 
these same hearings indicate that Congress must have intended merely to 
achieve a statutory revision of the terms of the disputes clause.31 Since the 
parties to a contract cannot, by that contract, deprive a court of its juris-
diction,32 alteration of the terms of a contract cannot affect jurisdiction. 
Finally, the act need not be interpreted as a jurisdictional statute in order 
to provide for the full effectuation of the act's purposes. 
It should also be noted that contract appeals boards are not independent 
administrative agencies, and the Court's decision has the effect of applying 
to the former the manner of review appropriate to the latter. It is true that 
the Wunderlich Act is a step toward formalization of the whole disputes 
process, but, until Congress sees fit to subject contract appeals boards to 
the Administrative Procedure Act or a similar procedural system, the de-
cisions of these boards should not be invested with the same degree of 
finality as, for example, those of the Federal Power Commission. 
Amos ]. Coffman, Jr. 
27 In practice this might in certain cases amount to an opportunity to place before 
the reviewing court all of the evidence relied on by the board which does not appear in 
the record. This procedure would assume particular significance in instances where 
the record is "inadequate." See principal case at 717. 
28 In Stein Bros, Mfg. Co. v. United States, 32 U.S.L. WEEK 2050 (Ct. Cl. July 12, 
1963), the Court of Claims held that the Wunderlich Act, as interpreted by the Supreme 
Court in the principal case, did not go to the jurisdiction of the reviewing court, but 
rather set forth procedural rights which must be asserted else they are waived. The court 
applied this doctrine in a case in which the Government failed to object to the holding 
of a trial de novo until after the trial itself had been completed. Accord, WPC Enter• 
prises, Inc. v. United States, 323 F.2d 874 (Ct. Cl. 1963). 
20 68 Stat. 81 (1954), 41 U.S.C. § 321 (1958). 
30 Their collective reaction to a disputes clause adopted by the defense department 
subsequent to the Wunderlich decision was only that, though the clause contained the 
standards generally believed to have prevailed prior to that decision, not all agencies 
would voluntarily adopt such a clause, and that no agency, once it adopted the clause, 
could be forced to retain it. Hearings on Review of Finality Clauses 32, 43-44, 58, 97, 
103. No one expressed the idea that it was necessary to circumscribe the jurisdiction of 
the reviewing courts in order to fulfill the general purpose of any of the proposed bills. 
81 Hearings on Review of Finality Clauses 35, 97. 
82 6A CORBIN, CONTRACTS§ 1432 (1962), and authorities cited therein. 
